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This paper addresses the issue of “being together,” and more speciﬁcally the issue of
“being together in time.” We provide with an integrative framework that is inspired by
phenomenology, the enactive approach and dynamical systems theories. To do so, we
ﬁrst deﬁne embodiment as a living and lived phenomenon that emerges from agent-
world coupling. We then show that embodiment is essentially dynamical and therefore
we describe experiential, behavioral and brain dynamics. Both lived temporality and the
temporality of the living appear to be complex, multiscale phenomena. Next we discuss
embodied dynamics in the context of interpersonal interactions, and brieﬂy review the
empirical literature on between-persons temporal coordination. Overall, we propose that
being together in time emerges from the relational dynamics of embodied interactions and
their ﬂexible co-regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
How can we “share a moment” and experience this sharing? How
can we share some time, even if it is immaterial? How can we share
the intimacy of a moment despite the distance that usually sepa-
rates ourbodies? Howcanwe feel being together if thismeansmore
than being in the same place or doing the same thing? For time is
often taken for granted as an objective and physical dimension of
reality, the issue of sharing its lived experience has not been much
addressed by cognitive sciences. The aim of this paper is to pro-
vide a theoretical, phenomenological, and empirically grounded
framework that addresses this issue.
To do this, we rely on the complementary approaches of
phenomenology, enaction and dynamical systems (Froese and
Gallagher, 2012). We take embodiment, temporality and inter-
activity seriously, and it is on the basis of these three inter-related
dimensions that we construct our proposition. More precisely,
since being a body is necessary for us to live (and therefore share)
experiences, we ﬁrst deﬁne what we mean by embodiment. In a
second part, we address the issue of time as embodied, that is, the
issue of how time is experienced and what kind of temporality
underlies our embodiment. We then address the issue of embodi-
ment in the context of intersubjectivity, and more speciﬁcally the
issue of the embodiment of a properly intersubjective time. We
ﬁnally discuss our overall proposition.
WHAT IT IS TO BE EMBODIED
The notion of embodiment refers to numerous meanings (e.g.,
Wilson, 2002). In this section, we specify our understanding
of what it is to be embodied through the lens of the enac-
tive approach (Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson,
2007; McGann et al., 2013; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014) and
its phenomenological background (Husserl, 1913, 1931, 1952;
Merleau-Ponty, 1942, 1945). According to the enactive approach,
mind is both a living (observable, biological) and a lived (experi-
enced) phenomenon that emerges from agent∼world coupling1.
Since living and lived aspects are concretely intertwined (Thomp-
son and Varela, 2001), they can only be distinguished from
an observer’s point of view. By abstraction, we discuss them
successively; their entanglement will then become explicit.
EMBODIMENT AS A LIVING PHENOMENON
At the roots of the enactive approach, living has been deﬁned as
the self-production and self-maintenance of its own organization,
where “organization” means “the relations that exist among com-
ponent processes of a system” (Varela et al., 1974; Varela, 1979;
Maturana and Varela, 1987). It is thus a network whose opera-
tions are closed (i.e., each process has causes in and effects on
other processes of the system). This interdependency enables the
self-organized emergence of a coherent living unit. Emergence
designates two complementary processes: the “local to global”
formation of a new system (or pattern) out of the interactions
between coupled components (i.e., out of the reciprocal effects
they have on each other), and the “global to local” constraints
that the newly formed system exerts on its components and the
organization of their relations (Thompson and Varela, 2001). By
producing itself, the living system actively “afﬁrms” its own iden-
tity (it speciﬁes what it is), and thereby deﬁnes its own intrinsic
laws or norms of self-maintenance. In a word, the living system
1The tilde sign used in this text is a reference to Kelso and Engstrom (2006). It
denotes that paired concepts are dynamically related to each other: the separate
understanding of each concept remains incomplete as long as its complementary
aspect is not taken into account
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is auto-nomous (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran and
Egbert, 2014).
However, the autonomy of the living system is bounded by
the domain of its viable relations with the environment. The
boundaries of the living are therefore relational (rather than
merely “skin-bounded”). Further, by generating itself, the liv-
ing unit distinguishes itself from what it is not and thereby
deﬁnes what the environment is from its own point of view
(i.e., what counts as a signiﬁcant environment and which value
their relation has for the maintenance of its autonomous exis-
tence). The living unit thus constitutes an autonomous per-
spective on its own relations: interactions with the environ-
ment are asymmetrically anchored in its own, self-constituted
perspective (Barandiaran et al., 2009). The phenomenological
domain of the living is thus autonomous∼relational, which
means both that the living system’s interactions are autonomous
and that the autonomy of that system is realized interac-
tively.
When a living system has the ability to regulate its coupled
relations with the environment (as a function of the values that
emerge from its own norms), we speak of an embodied agent
whose interactive autonomy is adaptive (Di Paolo, 2005; Baran-
diaran et al., 2009): something has to be done to bring forth a
“difference thatmakes a difference”(to quote the sloganof Bateson,
1972), preferably in the right direction (i.e., in accordance with its
self-constituted norms). Cognition is thus broadly deﬁned as a
sense-making activity (Weber and Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005):
it consists in the enactment of a world of signiﬁcance and values
through autonomous interactions with the environment. In short,
cognitive experiences are enacted fromanautonomousperspective
that is intrinsically relational.
EMBODIMENT AS A LIVED PHENOMENON
In contrast of the above deﬁnition, classical accounts attribute
cognition the role of mentally and internally representing infor-
mation coming from the external world (Varela, 1988). Agent and
world, organism and environment, subject and object or inner
and outer are thus deﬁned as being a priori external to each
other. From a phenomenological point of view however, and
as shown throughout this text, these boundaries are not given.
These opposite poles only exist in the dynamics of their irre-
ducible relations. Indeed, in lived experience, (cognizing) subject
and (cognized) object are irreducible (Husserl, 1952), just like
we can not distinguish the look from the thing that is seen. The
detached, reﬂective stance is thus not our primary way of being
in the world. Rather, our connection with the world is primarily
corporeal and pre-reﬂective (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), as discussed
below.
Appearance of our lived world obviously depends on our sen-
sory structures, but motility directly affects how these sensory
structures are perturbated by the environnement: what we do
changes what can be sensed. The lived world is thus imprinted
by our sensorimotor embodiment and is constituted in the con-
text of our ongoing activity (McGann, 2010; McGann et al.,
2013). Sensorimotor coupling allows for coherence of both the
autonomous agent (its embodied experiences and its underly-
ing internal dynamics) and his relations with the world. This is
reﬂected in his own active and sensitive way of inhabiting the
world he enacts (Buhrmann et al., 2013).
To discuss our pre-reﬂective connection with the world, we
refer to the phenomenological distinction between the living body
and the lived body. The living body refers to the image one can
have of a body (or one’s own body), observed and thematized as an
object of perception. The lived body is the pragmatic, unthema-
tized (hence pre-reﬂective) background of experience, it is what
our body-in-the-world affords us to sense and do (Lenay, 2010).
This bodily self-consciousness is necessary for our experiences
to be and feel “for” us, (Thompson, 2007). It is transparent to
us: it is the pre-reﬂective background of our perspective, the
point from which we see, do and live. In turn, affordances of
the lived body are constantly reshaped by the ongoing activity
of the living body: we enact the pre-reﬂective background of
our perspective. Living and lived body thus co-constitute each
other, and this is what deﬁnes embodiment (Thompson and
Varela, 2001). It provides us with an autonomous perspective
on our relations with the world (the phenomenal world that we
enact and inhabit). Because both the co-constitution of lived and
living body and the intertwinement of autonomy and relations
are dynamical, we now turn our attention to the temporality of
embodiment.
THE EMBODIED MIND IN TIME
To address the issue of embodiment and temporality, we ﬁrst
present a phenomenological account of the time as lived, or time
consciousness. Then, we address the issue of the temporality of the
living. The co-constitution of lived temporality and temporality
of the living will then be explicited.
TIME CONSCIOUSNESS
Time consciousness is directed toward both the “outer” objects
or events that have a temporal extension, and the “inner” expe-
rience of duration itself (i.e., the feeling of living enduring
experiences with a temporal envelope; Thompson, 2007). This
outer∼inner separation is only an abstract description from an
external observer’s point of view: these aspects are irreducible in
concretely lived experience. Indeed, we do not have an experience
of the temporal extension of objects or events on the one side,
and a sensation of our own enduring temporal experiences on the
other: these aspects manifest themselves as a whole in a uniﬁed
way (Thompson, 2007).
Husserl (1928) and its commentators (e.g., Merleau-Ponty,
1945; Varela, 1999a; Zahavi, 2003; Thompson, 2007; Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2014) proposed a descriptive structure that accounts
for both outer and inner time consciousness as well as their
non-separateness. This structure consists in three inter-related
component processes: primal impression, retention and proten-
tion. Primal impression designates the openness to the current
“now-phase” of an object. This “now” is never lived in isolation
of its temporal horizons, for there would be no time-extended
perception (duration, succession or change) if present was lived
as a succession of inarticulate moments (Varela, 1999a; Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2014). Primal impression thus only exists in the net-
worked conjunction with retention and protention. Retention is
the subjective holding of the just-elapsed phase of the object or
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event that is receding into the past. Protention intends the phase
of the object or event that is just about to occur: it is the temporal
horizon formed by the (implicit) anticipation of the unfolding of
experience.
These component processes do not behave “additively”
(Gallagher and Zahavi, 2014): in the fullness of concrete expe-
riences, they can’t be separated so as to manifest themselves as
“retention + primal impression + protention” (i.e., they do not
provide with diachronic feelings such as distinctly articulated past,
present and future). Indeed, primal impression is qualiﬁed by
both retention and protention: “now” would be different in the
context of another retention and implicit anticipation. In turn,
primal impression shapes what temporal horizon might be antic-
ipated, and (re)shapes the way its retentional background is felt
(it puts, as it were, the retentional trace into perspective, such
that when a surprise arises from the unfulﬁllment of a proten-
tion, its presentiﬁcation transforms the felt quality of the retained
experience). Component processes of time consciousness thus
qualify each other: they are inter-related in a “multiplicative” way
(Gallagher and Zahavi, 2014). These processes operate synchron-
ically and their interactive product manifests as a uniﬁed whole
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945). It provides with a complex temporal ﬁeld,
a“specious”present in the thickness of which objects or events can
be experienced with a time-extended quality (Varela, 1999a).
This threefold structure thus does not function as a mere slid-
ingwindow (where protentionswould becomeprimal impressions
which would further become retention). Retention, for instance,
is not the intentional aiming of an absent phase of the outer object
or event, for it is not possible to directly aim at something that
is not actually there. Rather, retention refers to the just-elapsed
phase of the experience of that object or event (Thompson, 2007).
Because this experience had a threefold (primal impression –
retention – protention) structure, what retention holds is a full
threefold structure. Protention also has a threefold structure, for
it intends what is anticipated to be about to qualify as retention,
primal impression and protention. As component processes of
the threefold (retention – primal impression – protention) struc-
ture “holds” the same threefold structure again (and so on), the
dynamical ﬂow of time-consciousness can be said to have a frac-
tal structure (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2014). Fractality captures
the self-similarity of a structure: constituting parts resemble the
whole they form across multiple scales of observation or “zooms”.
Vrobel (2011) also proposed a fractal interpretation of Husser-
lian accounts, in which “nows” (threefold structures) are nested
into each other, and can be thought as different timescales or
“levels of description”. Nesting nows provide nested nows with
a (common) context in the light of which they are experienced.
This multiscale structure is necessary for the current note of a
melody to be meaningfully experienced not only in the narrow
context of its predecessor, but also in the larger contexts of the
melody or the whole piece it belongs to, or even the evening
when it was listened to. In turn, nested nows can affect the
experience of the contextual background inwhich they are embed-
ded, such that the current note can modify how its embedding
retentional background and its protentional horizon are experi-
enced (especially if that note is surprising). Time as experienced
thus does not follow a unidimensional, linear chronology: the
temporal texture of lived experience thus has a multiscale, fractal
topology.
Time consciousness has a multiplicative, self-referential struc-
ture: it makes references to its own retained pasts and anticipated
futures. It is thereby a self-constituted ﬂow: it manifests itself
to itself, enabling the experience of the enduring quality of its
own dynamics (the so-called “inner” time consciousness). This
ﬂow is therefore the “absolute,” irreducible, most fundamen-
tal level of time consciousness, and the necessary background
out of which any experience can arise (Thompson, 2007). In
other words, it is the pre-reﬂective structure of consciousness
(Zahavi, 2003), the transparent background of our embodied
perspective. This perspective is thus not just a point of view
in the spatial domain: it is also a temporal perspective (Vrobel,
2011). The lived body thus has to be seen from the dynamical
point of view of this ﬂow. Because it presents itself as an affor-
dance, the lived body is oriented toward what is anticipated to
be about to be enacted. This orientation is underlain by the bro-
ken symmetry of time consciousness (to-be-fulﬁlled protentions
intend what hasn’t been yet, in contrast to retentions that hold
what has actually been). The dynamical structure of conscious-
ness is thus always incomplete and moves forward, toward the
complementarity of afforded anticipations. In this sense, time
consciousness is enactive (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2014), pragmat-
ically oriented toward (what) perception and action (could be).
In turn, because perception and action emerge from this ﬂow,
they are imprinted by its dynamics and therefore have a similar
structure.
Finally, because of the complex processes whereby components
qualify each other dynamically, contents of experience affect its
own intrinsic temporality (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2014). Indeed,
think for instance about the fulﬁllment (or lack thereof) of a
retained protention, and how it shapes primal impressions, their
retentional background and their protented horizon. The ﬂow of
time consciousness thus makes present both the temporal content
of experience and the temporal experience itself (i.e., both the
“what” and the “how”). Outer and inner aspects of time con-
sciousness thus co-constitute each other dynamically. Intrinsic
temporality of experience thereby embodies the dynamics of the
environment (Vrobel, 2011). Our dynamical perspective is thus
relational as well.
Overall, embodiment constitutes an autonomous∼relational
perspective whose dynamical background is self-referential, mul-
tiscale and multiplicative. This forms a pre-reﬂectively lived
background from which we can inhabit the world. How does
temporality manifest itself in the domain of the living? More
speciﬁcally, how does the temporality of a complex organism
emerge in a uniﬁed, coherent coordinated way? It is important
to address this issue if we want to ﬁnd out how time can be shared
and what kind of temporality can be shared.
TEMPORALITY OF THE LIVING
In this subsection, we discuss the processes that account for the
features of the temporality of experiences, namely, its endogenous
self-constitution, its non-linear, non-chronological unfolding, its
multiscale, fractal nature, and its permeability to the environ-
ment’s temporality. We also introduce the dynamical concepts and
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models that will guide us toward a general understanding of how
different temporalities can get coordinated and shared. We ﬁrst
refer to a simple, abstract model, in the light of which we discuss
the temporality of both brain and behavioral dynamics.
In 1665, Huygens (Hugenii, 1673) deceptively observed that
two pendulum clocks he designed for the sake of increased pre-
cision actually drifted apart when they were placed in isolated
rooms. However, when they were placed on the same plank,
their respective ticking converged until they reached synchrony,
a state in which they then stayed. Though the clocks oscillated
autonomously, they were ﬂexible enough so as to be mutually
affected by the vibrations they transmitted to each other (through
the plank by which they were coupled). Because of the reci-
procity of their interaction, clocks’ ticking became dependant on
each other, and got attracted toward a common pattern. This
pattern can then persist by efﬁcaciously and commonly con-
straining clocks’ ticking. The stability of the collective system
thus emerges from the interactions between its variable com-
ponents. In dynamical systems terminology, such stability is
captured by an “order parameter” (Haken, 1983) or a “collective
variable” (Kelso, 1995), which measures the ordering of the rela-
tions among components. Emergent synchrony between coupled
behaviors is actually ubiquitous in nature, though it manifests
in obviously more complex ways (Pikovsky et al., 2001; Stro-
gatz, 2003). Some of the most fundamental issues in brain and
behavioral sciences are related to this phenomenon: how can
large-scale coherent activity be formed in the brain out of its
noisy basal functioning? How can coherent movements be per-
formed despite of the numerous degrees of freedom they involve?
The hypothesis according to which temporal coordination or
“synergies” (Haken, 1983) emerge from the non-linear dynam-
ics of interactions between coupled components (Kelso, 1995;
Varela, 1995) has gained further and further support over the
years. A brief look on brain and behavioral dynamics will help
us to naturalize the temporality of lived experience as well as to
understand how different components can coordinate in time by
interacting.
As a result of non-linear interactions between neurons’ activ-
ity, brain oscillations can couple (Kelso, 1995; Varela, 1999a).
Because brain signals are composed by a broad range of adja-
cent periodicities, oscillations whose frequencies are close enough
can converge by reciprocally inﬂuencing each other (Buzsaki,
2006). This enables the emergence of large-scale synchronized
patterns of activity, or assemblies. However, because of the detun-
ing between intrinsic periodicities of neurons, coupling is weak:
soft-assembled components quickly relax toward their intrinsic
dynamics. Emergent assemblies are therefore transient, short-
lived, and are followed by their own dismantlement (Buzsaki,
2006). This continuous reorganization is a signature of metasta-
bility, a regime characterized by the coexistence of contrasting
tendencies: the integrative tendency of neurons to “cooperate”
(i.e., to align their behavior through reciprocal interactions) and
their segregative tendency to return to their intrinsic, autonomous
functioning (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). This allows for both the
emergence of patterns of activity that are stable enough to be
sustained over a signiﬁcant period of time, and their ﬂexible
dismantling in order to make room for new patterns, which
is important in the face of rapidly and ever-changing envi-
ronmental conditions. Fluctuations thus enable the emergence
of new stable (but ﬂexible) patterns of coordinated activity:
the variability of processes itself is therefore functional and
adaptive.
The timescale at which large-scale assemblies are formed
(hundreds of milliseconds) correlates well with the subjective
impression of nowness: their short-lived maintenance allows for
the thickness of the specious present (Varela, 1999a). Accord-
ing to Varela, the order parameter that captures the coherence
of these soft-assemblies reﬂect an ordering that constrains future
assemblies, a correlate of protention. The dynamic ﬂow of brain
activity is thus constrained and imprinted by the trace of ongoing
and therefore previous patterns’ formations: it thereby consti-
tutes retentional dynamics (Varela, 1999a). Varela (1999a; see
also Freeman, 2000) designated other neurodynamical timescales:
the micro-level of sensorimotor events (tenths of milliseconds)
and the macro-level at which successive assemblies are coherently
ordered (a few seconds). Interestingly, themany adjacent periodic-
ities of brain signals exhibit a 1/f power law (the longer the periods
of oscillations, the larger the amplitude of their contribution to
the signal), a typical signature of fractal, metastable processes
(Buzsaki, 2006; Werner, 2010). This encourages a view similar
to Vrobel’s theory (2011) in which activities at different timescales
are nested into each other, the slowest timescales of ﬂuctuations
constraining or enslaving the activity of the fastest ones (Penny
et al., 2008). Overall, brain dynamics do not unfold according to
a single timescale of operation. They evolve coherently, thanks to
the interactions between ﬂuctuating processes whose operations
span multiple timescales. Brain dynamics thus seem to shape the
felt envelope of time (Lutz et al., 2002) as well as to account for its
complex multiscale texture.
How to achieve coherent behaviors despite of the numerous
degrees of freedom they involve? Self-organization of compo-
nent processes in a metastable regime would lead to “synergies”
that are easier to guide (Bernstein, 1967; Haken, 1983). Biman-
ual rhythmic tasks support that hypothesis. Participants have
been asked to give regular taps with both hands in alternance,
by following the pace of a metronome (Kelso et al., 1981). When
its frequency was increased until a certain critical threshold,
patterns of movements suddenly shifted toward another orga-
nization: participants spontaneously, irremediably, and abruptly
tapped with both hands in phase. The motor system bifurcated
non-linearly from a bistable regime (two possible patterns of
behavior coexist) to a monostable one (only one pattern can be
stabilized in these circumstances). This metastable phenomenon
can be modeled by the dynamics of a relational variable that
measures the ordering of the relations among components’ activ-
ity (the relative phase between the limbs). Before the phase
transition toward the uninstructed pattern occured, this rela-
tional variable started to ﬂuctuate. This translates the loss of
stability of the current pattern, which allows for a ﬂexible reor-
ganization of behavior (i.e., the sudden, emergent switching
toward a more stable pattern). Behavioral dynamics thus seem
to emerge from the self-organized interactions of components
rather than from the sole properties of these components or from
explicit central instructions (Kelso, 1995). In other words, and
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from a general point of view, common or coherent temporal
patterns can emerge from the relational dynamics between var-
ious components: these collective patterns manifest themselves
as attractors that dynamically co-ordinate in time components’
behaviors.
The multiscale, non-linear, ﬂuctuating dynamics of brain and
behavior are at odds with the classical view of time. Time is
usually assimilated to its “objective” measurement and is sub-
sequently described as a linear succession of isochronous units
(Varela, 1999a). In the context of rhythmic behaviors, this view
prompts to take stable, metronome-like regularity as the norm.
Variability is thus seen as a deviation from that norm, as an error
in cognitive measurements or motor implementations (Wing and
Kristofferson, 1973; Delignières andTorre, 2009).While the tempo
of music is indeed felt as having a stable quality in despite of
the inherent variability of musicians’ performances (Large and
Palmer, 2002), listeners experience these ﬂuctuations as well, and
not as errors or mere approximations. Rather, these ﬂuctuations
convey expressivity (Collier and Collier, 1996; Palmer, 1997; Iyer,
2002), a phenomenon also observed in mother-infant interac-
tions (Gratier, 2003; Gratier and Apter-Danon, 2009). Variability
of behavior thus makes sense. In fact, rather than being mere
noise to ignore (whether statistically or cognitively), ﬂuctuations
of rhythmic performances exhibit a highly structured complex-
ity. Studies on pianists (Rankin et al., 2009), drummers (Hennig
et al., 2011, 2012) or non-musicians (e.g., Delignières et al., 2004;
Lemoine et al., 2006) show that human tempo ﬂuctuations are
fractal: they display similar structures across scales of observation,
with their amplitude decreasing with their frequency according to
a 1/f law. The resulting rhythmic behavior is thus composed by the
intertwinement of ﬂuctuations of various amplitudes and period-
icities, like waves enslaved in larger waves. Patterns of behavior
are thus organized at multiple timescales, even when the task’s
instructions target a unique timescale, such as the pulse.
The fractal structure of human temporality has been observed
inmany situations and seems to be the norm rather than the excep-
tion (for a review, see Van Orden et al., 2009). The hypothesis
according to which fractal properties are generated by compo-
nent processes (Pressing and Jolley-Rogers, 1997; Wagenmakers
et al., 2004) is therefore fragile. Alternatively, fractality is thought
to emerge from multiplicative interactions between processes that
operate at multiple timescales (Van Orden et al., 2003; see Torre
and Wagenmakers, 2009 and Delignières and Marmelat, 2012,
2013, for debates about these hypothesis). The latter hypothesis
is supported by recent studies showing that behavioral dynamics
actually exhibit multifractal properties (Ihlen andVereijken, 2010;
Dixon et al., 2012). While monofractal measurements only point
out the co-presence of multiple timescales of ﬂuctuations, multi-
fractality captures the presence of contingencies across timescales
of behavioral dynamics: underlying processes therefore interact
at multiple timescales (Kelty-Stephen et al., 2013). Fractality has
also been observed at multiple scales of organization and in many
different measurements of the same behavior: this “pervasiveness”
of fractality has been linked to metastability and the emergence
of soft-assemblies (Kello et al., 2008; Kello and Van Orden, 2009;
Holden et al., 2011). Indeed, while metastability reﬂects the bal-
ance of processes’ dependance and independance (their tendency
to function in relation with each other versus autonomously),
fractal ﬂuctuations reﬂect the balance of temporal dependance
and independance between processes through time and at differ-
ent timescales. Fractality would thus be a signature of metastable
dynamics. Relative dependance between processes and enslave-
ment of local dynamics in ﬂuctuations of larger timescales can
create (long-term) correlations that fractal measurements cap-
ture. In contrast to uncorrelated ﬂuctuations of independant
processes, long-term correlations provide with a dynamical coher-
ence that allows for amore robust unfolding of behavior. However,
too rigidly correlated ﬂuctuations (such as those introduced by
strongly interdependent processes) wouldn’t let enough room for
fast reorganization of behavior when demands of the environ-
ment change. Soft coupling of processes thus allows for a blend
of stability and adaptive ﬂexibility, and fractality illustrates opti-
mal, healthy metastable dynamics whose complexity is often lost
with pathology (Stergiou and Decker, 2011). The temporal base-
line of biological dynamics is therefore complex, metastable and
(multi-)fractal, rather than linear.
Brain and behavioral coordination thus doesn’t start “from
scratch”: it doesn’t require the explicit control of all parame-
ters or components involved in a speciﬁc pattern. Metastable
dynamics providewith abackground that“do something”for coor-
dination. These spontaneous endogenous dynamics constitute a
dynamical landscape that orients behaviors’ trajectories toward
stable attractors (Kelso, 2009). In support of this view, it is this
underlying dynamical landscape that is affected as a whole by
learning (Kostrubiec et al., 2012). The role of intentional agency
would thereby be to actively modulate this complex background
of ongoing dynamics, in order to stabilize or destabilize its intrin-
sic tendencies (Kelso, 2002; see also Tschacher and Haken, 2007).
This metastable background thus shapes what it is afforded to
do and sense: it dynamically orients behaviors and experiences
and is therefore a correlate of the lived body. Because it is con-
stituted by processes that interact at multiple timescales and are
nested into each other, metastable dynamics carry a portion of
their own past in which they are embedded, and preﬁgurate a
part of their upcoming trajectories. Metastable, fractal dynamics
thus have a retentional-and-protentional structure that correlates
well with the complex texture of the temporality of experiences
(Vrobel, 2011). Our behaviors and the lived experiences they
bring forth would be entangled in and shaped by these metastable
dynamics. In turn, experiences and intentional agency can then
act as global constraints that modulate and guide local endoge-
nous dynamics (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Kelso, 2002). Living
and lived embodiment thus co-constitute each other and form
a dynamical embodiment whose temporality is complex, multi-
scale, (multi-)fractal, and retentional-protentional, rather than
linear and chronological. This embodied temporality emerges as
a whole from a complex but ﬂexible background of relational
dynamics, wherein processes interact with each other at multiple
timescales.
THE EMBODIED MIND IN THE TIME OF THE WORLD
So far,we considered the embodimentof timeby subjectswhowere
isolated from any environmental constraints (except the boundary
conditions of experimental tasks). If embodiment is relationally
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1180 | 5
Laroche et al. Embodiment of intersubjective time
constituted, its underlying dynamics should be imprinted by the
environment’s temporality, as we show below.
Entraining to external temporalities happens very sponta-
neously at multiple timescales. For example, if we were isolated
from the outside world, our wake/sleep cycles would not last
24 h (Czeisler et al., 1980). At a much smaller timescale, body
movements can be unintentionally entrained to the oscillations
of a moving room (that is merely displayed on a screen; Dijk-
stra et al., 1994) or even smaller stimuli (Lopresti-Goodman et al.,
2007; Schmidt et al., 2007). Interestingly, synchronizing a limb in
antiphase with a metronome whose frequency is increased brings
forth the same dynamical features as tasks involving the syn-
chronization of two limbs (Kelso, 1984). This isomorphism again
suggests that patterns of coordination emerge from dynamics that
exist at the level of the coupling (between limbs or between limb
and metronome) rather than from the sole intrinsic properties of
involved components.
Coordinating to the environment happens simultaneously and
interactively at multiple timescales. For example, we synchro-
nize in a more stable fashion to pulses that are embedded into
larger patterns (Drake, 1993). Grouping pulses into larger patterns
emerges spontaneously: participants do it during the performance
of a mere pulse without any intention or awareness to do so
(Parncutt, 1994) and perceive larger patterns that have no coun-
terpart in objective information when they listen to isomorph,
isochronous pulses (Bolton, 1894). Musicians’ expressive ﬂuctu-
ations reﬂect the organization of larger patterns as well (Repp,
1997) and enhance listeners’coordination at these larger timescales
(Drake et al., 2000). Synchronization to a pulse is also stabilized
by the presence of subdivisions forming simple patterns (Repp,
2003) and destabilized when the ﬁne-grained timing of these sub-
divisions is altered (Repp, 2008). More generally, the way one
coordinates to a particular timescale of a stimulus reﬂects the
temporal organization of that stimulus at other timescales (Large
et al., 2002). We thus embody the stimulus’ temporality at these
timescales as well, and this constrains the dynamics that operate
at the targeted scale.
We do not just embody plurifrequential rhythms though
(Toiviainen et al., 2010), but also the complex structure of their
ﬂuctuations. For instance, when participants synchronize to the
tempo of a piece of music whose ﬂuctuations are fractal, they
produce taps whose variability quantiﬁably match that fractal
structure. Conversely, participants’ taps do not exhibit a fractal
structure at all in presence of a metronomic version of the same
performance (Rankin et al., 2009). Participants’ taps alsomatch the
complexity of pulses of metronomes that ﬂuctuate fractally (Hunt
et al., 2014; Marmelat et al., 2014a) or chaotically (Stephen et al.,
2008). Such a tight coupling is not the result of a mere “imitation”
of the ﬂuctuations bymeans of local adjustments. Rather, themul-
tifractal structure of taps indicates that the pattern of coordination
is more complex and emerges out of the interactions between pro-
cesses operating at multiple timescales (Stephen and Dixon, 2011).
Coupling with the environment thus seems to modulate the whole
multiscale complexity of internal dynamics, even when the stimu-
lation’s frequency is restricted to a narrow frequency band (e.g., a
ﬂuctuating pulse). As a result, multiscale patterns of coordination
with the environment emerge as wholes. In this regard, (Large and
Jones, 1999; Large, 2001, 2008; Large and Palmer, 2002) proposed
models that account for perceptual and motor coordination to
expressive ﬂuctuations as well as to multiscale patterns. Endoge-
nous dynamics are modeled by coupled autonomous oscillators
whose respective intrinsic frequencies span multiple timescales.
Their non-linear interactions enable the emergence of coordinated
patterns of internal activity that span multiple timescales as well.
The rhythmic signal acts as a sensory perturbation for ongoing
internal activity. Coordination to that signal is thus modeled by
the subsequent entrainment of internal oscillators to the period-
icities of the signal. However, because oscillators are coupled with
each other, the signal does not merely perturbate them individu-
ally, or frequency band by frequency band. Rather, the stimulus
modulates the complex organization of endogenous dynamics as
a whole, a general model whose essence captures the aforemen-
tioned empirical observations and ﬁts our theoretical construction
well.
On the one hand, multiscale patterns of coordination are
constituted by an autonomous perspective: they emerge from
the background of its ongoing endogenous dynamics (such that
different patterns might emerge in the context of different ongo-
ing internal dynamics, even when environmental circumstances
are identical). On the other hand, patterns of coordination are
constituted in relational dynamics: they are a product of the
interactions with the world. Indeed, when sensory perturbations
affect an agent’s internal dynamics, it modiﬁes how these dynam-
ics can later be modulated and what patterns can emerge out
of it. This way, as in lived experience, inner and outer tempo-
ral dynamics co-constitute each other irreducibly. Endogenous
and relational dynamics are thus intertwined such that patterns
of coordination are both autonomous and relational. Because
they are constrained by the dynamical traces of what is going
on endogenously and thereby by the traces of agent∼ world rela-
tional dynamics, patterns of coordination are retentional. Internal
dynamics thus embody the regularities of the environment in
its own ﬂuctuating activity. Because sensory perturbations are
experienced in the light of this ongoing activity, this dynamical
backgound provides with implicit anticipations, or protentions.
For instance, when internal dynamics are modulated and sta-
bilized by a certain pattern of perturbations that is repeated,
a sudden difference in the stimulus introduces a difference in
the agent∼world’s relation: it unfulﬁlls the protention embodied
in the agent’s ongoing internal dynamics. Dynamical embodi-
ment of external temporalities thus allows for a strong, multiscale
coordination with the environment (Dubois, 2003; Stepp and Tur-
vey, 2010). Dynamical models that blend internal and relational
dynamics therefore provide with a framework for both percep-
tual and motor coordination to the world. In this regard, the
relations between participants’ patterns of activity and patterns
of stimulation were investigated [e.g., the relation between pat-
terns of response times and the temporal patterning of successive
stimuli (Holden et al., 2011) or the relative phase between par-
ticipants’ taps and the metronome they follow (e.g., Chen et al.,
2001)]. In these cases, the dynamics of these relations exhibit
fractal ﬂuctuations as well, in a way that strongly depends on
the temporality of the context of the task (Holden et al., 2011).
This further points out that soft-assembled, metastable patterns
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of coordination emerge at the level of the whole agent∼world
coupling.
Overall, interactions between processes operating at multiple
timescales form an endogenous background of metastable dynam-
ics. It is from this background that temporal coordination of
activity and experiences can emerge. It is therefore the back-
ground of our autonomous perspective: it orients the dynamics of
our embodiment (i.e., both experiences and behaviors). Because
it is modulated by the dynamics of its relations with the world,
this “dynamical landscape” embodies the environment. Relational
dynamics thus shape the dynamical landscape of our “sensori-
motor habitat” (Buhrmann et al., 2013). The coordinated inhabi-
tance of the world we enact is therefore autonomous∼relational.
Embodiment is thus a dynamical phenomenon, and it is the tem-
porality of the behaviors and the experiences it gives rise to that
can be shared in human interactions (i.e., it is in the course of
these dynamics that we can be together). To address this issue
in more depth, we ﬁrst discuss how embodiment and intersub-
jectivity relate to each other. We then question the temporality
that emerges from the dynamics of their relation, and how this
temporality is embodied by interacting subjects.
EMBODIMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE TIME
EMBODIMENT AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY
When we meet an other person, “what” we interact with is a
“who” (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009): another embodied per-
spective. This transforms the dynamics of our embodiment in two
contrasting but complementary ways. On the one hand, because
the sensory-motor affordances of our respective embodiments are
similar, we are subtely sensitive to each other’s behaviors and to
a similar world. On the other hand, our very embodiment makes
alterity persist indeﬁnitely: our respective embodied perspectives
always differ (especially when they aim at one another). In this
subsection, we detail the phenomenological implications of these
two aspects successively, and then present experiments that track
their underlying dynamics.
During our mutual encounters, part of my transparently lived
body (e.g., my looking eyes, my expressing face) becomes a visi-
ble living body for the other (Lenay, 2010, who we closely follow
in the next two paragraphs). Because the other is sensitive to my
activity, the expression of my lived experience through my vis-
ible living body affects him and thereby changes his own lived
experience. I can thus modulate and participate to the other’s
experience. The expression of his own experience is visible to me
as well (especially the expression of the changes I induced in his
experience). I am therefore also living experiences to which the
other participates, in a way to which I participated to upstream.
The other thus becomes part of my embodied coupling with the
world: I do something to him that changes something for me.
This way, I can pragmatically experience the other, I can enact
him (I bring forth an experience of the other that emerges from
the consequences of my activity toward him). By the reciprocity
of this pragmatic link, we become part of each other’s embodied
coupling: our respective embodiments become dynamically con-
tingent of each other (we dynamically co-determine each other’s
behaviors and experiences). When we interact, we thus mutually
enact each other (Varela, 1999b; Thompson, 2001), so that we can
participate to and mutually incorporate each other’s embodied
perspective (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
It is thus by interacting that we can share experiences, activities,
meaning, and so to speak, points of view (De Jaegher andDi Paolo,
2007).
Whatever I do changes the other: he thus constantly escapes
my intentions toward him (Lenay, 2010). In return, changing
the other also affects me. During our interactions, I thus change
myself as well, so that any of my intentions glides in the inter-
action process itself, wherein they get remolded. By interacting,
I therefore also escape myself (hence the difﬁculty of applying a
prepared plan of conversation once the actual encounter is unfold-
ing). Our experiences of each other and ourselves are thus always
broken, incomplete and escape us so that our interactions keep
moving forward. Because the visible effects we have on each other
are transparently caused (by our pre-reﬂectively lived body), part
of the very linkage of our respective embodiments escapes both
of us as well. The dynamics of our relations thereby acquire an
autonomy of their own (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Because
these relational dynamics affect us simultaneously, they can efﬁ-
ciently coordinate our respective embodiments and constitute our
behaviors and experiences in a common fashion, from a common
dynamical background (De Jaegher et al., 2010). Our dynamical
embodiment is thus shaped by the dynamics of our relation: we
embody collective dynamics. In this sense, not only dowe incorpo-
rate each other’s perspective, but we also transparently incorporate
the dynamics of the interactionprocess itself (De Jaegher,2009). In
other words, the dynamical background of our embodied perspec-
tive is constituted in the process of interaction. The pre-reﬂectively
lived landscape that orients us in our sensorimotor habitat is
therefore interactively shaped (Kyselo and Tschacher, 2014).
Our respective embodiments thus become contingent of each
other not only because of their congruence, but also because
of their broken symmetry. On the one hand, incompleteness
of relational dynamics keeps the interaction moving forward.
The resulting dynamical autonomy of the interaction process can
thereby “bonds” our respective embodiments. On the other hand,
this incompletenessmakes alterity persists. The interactionprocess
thus always involves us personally and still imply our autonomous
agency (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2012). While embodiment is
constituted in and by relational dynamics, it is at the same time
these very relational dynamics that have to be actively regulated. As
it depends on the other and its the complementary involvement in
the process of interaction, the active modulation of interpersonal
coupling escapes us. As an individual effort, it is always incomplete.
It is a co-regulation of an irreducibly collective process. The co-
regulation of our coupling entails a dynamical congruence such
that an even more ﬁne-grained sharing of embodied dynamics
becomes possible. Further, because the process to regulate is col-
lective, sharing its modulation has a quality that is proper to the
interpersonal domain: itmakes sense in itself. Sharing experiences,
activities or meanings is thus not just about the content. It involves
an inter-enactive process whose dynamics have a proper quality
that makes sense on its own. Because its underlying dynamics
participate to our embodiment, and because we can experience
the consequences of the co-regulation of these dynamics, this
intersubjective quality can also make sense to us personally.
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Auvray et al. (2009) empirically tracked the general dynamical
structure of human interactions. Pairs of blindfolded participants
manipulated a device that reduced their sensorimotor coupling
to a strict minimum: each participant moved a mouse that dis-
placed an avatar in a virtual environment and participants received
a unique type of tactile stimulation whenever the receptor ﬁeld
of their avatar overlapped the position of an entity in that vir-
tual environment (Figure 1). There was thus only one bit of
information (0: no stimulation; 1: stimulation). In this context,
participants couldn’t distinguish if the stimulations they received
resulted from the crossing of their partner, or from the cross-
ing of a lure that imitated the partner’s displacements. However,
participants met each other a lot more often than they met the
lure: they found each other without knowing they did. The dif-
ference between the two situations emerges at the collective level.
The lure is disembodied: it doesn’t receive any stimulations that
modify the internal dynamics of its behavior. Conversely, the part-
ner is embodied and the overlap with its receptor ﬁeld leads to
a mutual stimulation. Even if all participants participant ignore
what they do for the other (Lenay, 2010), they affect each other’s
behaviors. They thereby got attracted toward a common pattern
of behavior (a reversal of movements around the source of stimu-
lation). In other words, they were oriented and coordinated by the
mutual and common effects of the interaction process, without
any awareness of the dynamical situation in which their behav-
ior got entangled. This illustrates how the incompleteness of the
encounter (i.e., what I do for the other escapes me, as well as
what the dynamics of our patterns of relations do for us) allows
FIGURE 1 | Experimental set-up of Auvray et al. (2009). (A)Technological
device set up by Auvray et al. (2009). (B) Schematic illustration of the
(invisible) virtual environment. Movements of the mouse displaced the
receptor ﬁeld of an avatar in a one-dimensional virtual environment.
Whenever the receptor ﬁeld overlaps the current position of another entity,
the participant that manipulates this avatar receives a tactile stimulation.
Reprinted from Auvray et al. (2009), with permission from Elsevier.
for the interaction to move forward on its own. The coordination
of behavior that is observed externally can thus emerge from the
process of interaction and/or its regulation (Froese et al., 2012;
Lenay and Stewart, 2012; see Auvray and Rohde, 2012, for a review
of replications of the above experiment with both human par-
ticipants and artiﬁcial agents). Boker et al. (2009) captured such
kind of phenomenon in a somewhat more ecological experiment.
They reduced the visible expressivity of one of two conversational
partners by resynthesizing the movements of its realistic avatar.
This effect was transparent to him, but visible to his partner, who
enhanced the amplitude of his own movements, as if he were
compensating for this lack of expressivity. The complementary
regulation of coupling dynamics then became explicit as both
partners ended up enhancing the expressivity of their movements,
without any awareness to do so. Their behaviors became thus
entangled in relational dynamics between their embodiment in a
way that escaped them.
Relational dynamics can attract agents’ internal dynamics
toward behavioral regions that aren’t reachable or attracting out-
side of a mutually engaging situation (Froese and Fuchs, 2012; see
Laroche andKaddouch,2014, in the domainof musical pedagogy).
The process of interaction can thus transform individual reper-
toires of behaviors by shaping the underlying dynamical landscape
that orients them. Relational dynamics thus modulate our affor-
dances such that we embody collective dynamics (i.e., collective
dynamics are part of our embodied coupling). In the experi-
ment of Auvray et al. (2009) though, the embodiment of collective
dynamics didn’t seem to entail a distinct experience (participants
didn’t distinguish the lure from the partner). With more precise
measurements of lived experience and by explicitly encouraging
participants to collaborate, Froese et al. (2014a) observed that they
could discriminate each other from the lures. Partners relied on
the dynamical complementarity afforded by their interaction and
actively co-regulated their coupling. Judgments were thus based
on the enactive experience of irreducibly collective dynamics. In
support of that interpretation, mutual recognition increased the
clarity of experience of the other’s presence: collective patterns
modulate personal experiences. Subjects thus embodied relational
dynamics in the full sense of the term: their behavior was livingly
oriented by the interaction process, and they had a distinct expe-
rience of the relational dynamics they co-regulated and in which
they were caught.
If, by interacting, we can participate to each other’s embodi-
ment, then we participate to each other’s pre-reﬂective dynamical
background. The temporalities of our respective embodiments
should thus get coordinated as an effect of interacting. Because
the process of interaction escapes us, it can bring forth a tem-
porality of its own: a properly intersubjective time (Gratier and
Apter-Danon, 2009) that emerges from interpersonal relational
dynamics. Because the process of interaction coordinates us, we
can also embody this temporality (it participates to our dynamical
background). By actively regulating relational dynamics that affect
us, we can experience this intersubjective temporality by ourselves.
It is precisely because this regulation partly escapes us and involves
the complementarity of our respective activities that we can expe-
rience its intersubjective quality. This is in the course of such an
intersubjective time that we can be together. This intersubjective
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quality has to be brought forth before it can be experienced and
thus shared in a dynamical and embodied way. Being together
(as experienced enactively) can therefore be hypothesized to be
the experience of the coordination of our dynamical embodied
perspectives that emerges from our relational dynamics and their
co-regulation. More precisely, in light of the previous sections,
intersubjective time should yield autonomous∼relational patterns
of coordination underlain by multiscale metastable dynamics. In
the next subsection, we discuss empirical results that support this
hypothesis.
EMBODIMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE TIME
In this subsection, we address the issue of the embodiment of
intersubjective time. We brieﬂy review the empirical literature
that supports hypotheses that emerged from the framework that
has been built so far. We ﬁrst point out that behavioral dynam-
ics coordinate during interpersonal interactions, so that it leads
to the emergence of a common, shared temporality of behav-
ior. Afterwards, we verify that this coordination emerges from the
metastable relational dynamics of between-persons interactions.
Next mutuality of interaction is shown to play a proper role in
these dynamics. This leads us to point out that the experience of
the intersubjective dimension of interpersonal timing is enacted
thanks to the co-regulation of the interaction process. It therefore
requires the personal but ﬂexible engagement of individuals. We
then discuss the functional role of ﬂuctuations in interpersonal
coordination dynamics. Finally we show that these dynamics and
their co-regulation coordinate interacting persons in a multiscale
and multiplicative way, and that this forms a shared dynamical
background in which behaviors and experiences are entangled.
The temporal coordination of individual behaviors manifests
spontaneously in our daily interactions (Condon and Ogston,
1966), most often in a rhythmic way (Condon, 1986; Bernieri
and Rosenthal, 1991; Gill, 2012). For instance, both newborns
and adults tend to synchronize their movements to the speech
of their interlocutor (Condon and Ogston, 1971; Condon and
Sander, 1974). Behavioral coordination is multimodal (Kendon,
1970; Barbosa et al., 2012; Louwerse et al., 2012; Bangerter and
Mayor, 2013) as well as physiological (Guastello et al., 2006; Feld-
man, 2007; Feldman et al., 2011; Müller and Lindenberger, 2011).
A tight temporal coupling is even observed in breathings dur-
ing turn-taking (McFarland, 2001) and speech rates converge
(Street, 1984). Whereas conversations seem to be structured by
an alternance of roles (speaker vs listener), behaviors are thus
underlain by a common temporal framework. Relational dynam-
ics seem to attract individual temporalities toward a shared timing
(Deschamps et al., 2012; Froese et al., 2012). In laboratory settings,
individually prefered tempi indeed tend to move toward a com-
mon ground even when people coordinate unintentionally and
without awareness to do so (Oullier et al., 2008).
If coordinating in time isn’t the proper aim of daily interac-
tions, how does it arise? In the light of the previous sections, we
would expect that temporal coordination of behaviors emerges
spontaneously from the self-organization of between-persons
relational dynamics. This hypothesis is supported by numerous
studies (for reviews, see Oullier and Kelso, 2009; Delaherche
et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012; Dale et al., 2013; Lagarde, 2013).
For instance, when pairs of participants oscillate their legs in
anti-phase (opposite directions) at an increasing frequency, their
coupling becomes unstable near to a critical threshold; phase
wandering between attractors or abrupt transitions toward more
stable patterns is observed (Schmidt et al., 1990), a typical sig-
nature of self-organized dynamical systems that are modeled by
non-linearly coupled oscillators (see also Schmidt and Turvey,
1994; Amazeen et al., 1995). Interpersonal patterns of coordina-
tion thus follow the same dynamical laws than bimanual patterns
or unimanual-metronome patterns (see also Mottet et al., 2001;
Black et al., 2007; Richardson et al., 2007a). This isomorphism
suggests again that coordination emerges from the dynamics
of interaction rather than from the speciﬁc properties of the
coordinated components. Such synergistic effects have also been
observed in more ecological tasks such as martial arts and hand
clapping games (Riley et al., 2011), rocking chairs (Richardson
et al., 2007b; Frank and Richardson, 2010), in language games
that imply turn-taking (Schmidt et al., 2011) or in problem-
solving tasks (Shockley et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 2005; Coey
et al., 2011; see also Richardson et al., 2008; Shockley et al., 2009;
Fusaroli et al., 2014). During sport activities, whether players
are opponents or not, the dynamics of their coupling sponta-
neously self-organize and attractors emerge from their collective
dynamics as well (Bourbousson et al., 2008, 2010a,b; Travassos
et al., 2011; Yokoyama andYamamoto, 2011; Okumura et al., 2012;
Duarte et al., 2013; García et al., 2013). Whether intended or not,
interpersonal coordination is thus underlain by a similar dynam-
ical landscape constituted by attractors of collective dynamics
(Schmidt and O’Brien, 1997; Richardson et al., 2007b; Oullier
et al., 2008). The spontaneity of interpersonal dynamics is such
that coordination also emerges when participants are speciﬁcally
instructed not to do the same movements as their partner (Boker
and Rotondo, 2002; Issartel et al., 2007). Movements uninten-
tionally coordinate even when participants attend to a different
external pacer, up to the point that the very reorganization of
their own behavior tended to occur through simultaneous phase
transitions (Varlet et al., 2011). The coordinative efﬁcacy of the
process of interaction is thus difﬁcult to escape from. Because
it happens most often without any awareness on our behalf, it
precedes its explicit experience and thereby its regulation. Indi-
vidual behaviors thereby seem to be entangled in the relational
dynamics of their coupling. Intention and attention might then
guide the regulation of this metastable background of collec-
tive dynamics in order to stabilize it (see Temprado and Laurent,
2004).
Relational dynamics of interpersonal interactions involves two
autonomous embodied perspectives and are thus bidirectional.
Studies on interpersonal coordination dynamics rarely took this
aspect into account: usually, the comparison is made between
coupled and non-coupled situations. The enactive approach
emphasized the role of the very mutuality of interactions as a
source of coordination (e.g., Froese and Di Paolo, 2008), which
points out the properly interpersonal dimension of this phe-
nomenon. Murray and Trevarthen (1985) and Nadel et al. (1999)
evidenced the importance of the mutuality of the interaction pro-
cess. Infants and their mother interacted through a TV-monitor,
until the live retransmission of the mother’s behavior was replaced
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by a recording of her behavior made during the same interactional
sequence. Though infants observed the exact same behavior of
their mother in both situations, they reacted very differently when
they faced the recording, displaying anger and frustration. Prob-
ably because they could not experience their own contribution
in the regulation of the relational dynamics, they lost interest
in interacting with their non-responsive (recorded) mother. This
happens even when her image is delayed by three seconds only
(Henning and Striano, 2011). In adult video-conferences, slight
delays in the transmission of information can destabilize interper-
sonal coupling dramatically too (Nijholt et al., 2008). The mutual,
simultaneous sharing of the interaction process is thus critical to
interpersonal coordination, which can therefore not be reduced to
purely individual processes.
Collier and Burch (1998) made the general prediction that
bidirectional interactions between complex systems should yield
“more effects for less effort” (i.e., enhanced coordination for less
energy dissipation) than unidirectional interactions where only
one system can be affected by the other. Indeed, mutual inter-
actions entail more accurate and/or stable coordination than
unidirectional ones (Cummins, 2009; Konvalinka et al., 2010;
Shikanai and Hachimura, 2012; Hart et al., 2014), or than inter-
actions where participants had to follow a partner who has a
metronomic cue in his headphones (Oullier et al., 2003). More-
over, when mutual interactions are compared to unidirectional
ones, increased stability of coordination at the level of the inter-
personal coupling is accompanied by decreased ﬂuctuations at the
individual level (Hart et al., 2014), conﬁrming the general “more
effects for less effort” hypothesis (Collier and Burch, 1998). It
seems that relational dynamics enable the (potentially or partly
self-organized) co-regulation of each other’s variability, as if it
was the coupled system’s whole variability. Our inﬂuence on the
other, his responsiveness and the relational dynamics it entails thus
do something for our coordination: it lays a background of col-
lective dynamics that orient our inter-actions. By interacting, we
co-regulate this metastable background, and thereby co-organize
the dynamics of each other’s embodied background. This permits
to unload part of the coordinative process on the dynamics of
interactions themselves. Our embodiment is thus such that it can
beneﬁt from the (self-organized and co-regulated) complemen-
tary dynamics of each other’s actions. Conversely, unidirectional
coupling rigidiﬁes the situation. In this situation, variability can-
not be organized collectively: the entire inﬂexible variability of the
unresponsive partner has to be accomodated by the other on top of
his own ﬂuctuations. As already stated, stability (at the collective
level) thus involves ﬂexibility (at the individual level).
Unilateral and mutual embodied coupling thus have distinct
phenomenologies. However, during concrete interactions, these
two typical situations are extremities of a whole “spectrum of par-
ticipation” (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012). Different degrees of
involvement can indeed be invested in the regulation of the inter-
action process. Interacting therefore implies participating to the
modulation of the interaction process by modulating our partic-
ipation to that process. Attention could thus be directed toward
different aspects of autonomous∼relational patterns of coordi-
nation. Indeed, leaders (or socially dominant personalities) seem
more focused on their own behavioral temporality: they display
less ﬂuctuations and thereby interact in a more rigid fashion than
“followers” (Schmidt et al., 1994; Fairhurst et al., 2014; see also
Sacheli et al., 2013). Followers pay more attention to the stability
of the interaction process itself (Fairhurst et al., 2014). However,
participants classiﬁed as “socially dominated” can be overrespon-
sive (by taking the interactionprocess toomuch in charge; Schmidt
et al., 1994). This might not leave enough room for the personal
involvment of the other in the co-regulation of relational dynam-
ics and the variability of behaviors that underlies it (Repp and
Keller, 2008). For instance, social anxiety disorders entail difﬁ-
culties in intentionally leading a coordination task (Varlet et al.,
2014).
The coordinated regulation of interactions thus impliesmoder-
ate contingencies, that is, ﬂexible deviations from strict synchrony
(Gratier and Apter-Danon, 2009). Such ﬂexibility of the inter-
action process is also observed in mother-infants interactions,
where moderate contingencies are both preferred and preferable
for communication and development (Jaffe et al., 2001; Gratier,
2003; Hane et al., 2003; Gratier and Apter-Danon, 2009). Inter-
personal rhythmic structures facilitate and guide coordination by
providing embodied coupling with anticipatory dynamics. The
emergence of interpersonal rhythms thus allows for dynamical
backgrounds of embodiment to converge and to be organized
with congruent retentions and protentions. Flexible ﬂuctuations
are functionnal too. They provide with surprises and make the
interaction process incomplete (protentions are not entirely ful-
ﬁlled). This incompleteness then requires the active engagement
of participating individuals in the co-regulation of their relational
dynamics (Deckers et al., 2012). Further, ﬂexibility also permits to
repair coordination breakdowns by reorganizing the interaction
process. Optimal relational dynamics are thus a balance of sta-
bility and ﬂexibility, a compromise between random ﬂuctuations
and strictly metronomical rhythms. In other words, interpersonal
relational dynamics are metastable. This regime of interpersonal
coordination leaves enough room for autonomy, such that subjects
can experience their interactions in the background of their own
dynamical embodiment. It also leaves enough room for relational
dynamics to bring forth a temporality of their own. The co-
regulation of these dynamics provides with a common dynamical
background that modulates and coordinates autonomous embod-
iments. In this regard, spontaneous imitations of each other’s
behavior entail the temporal coordination of brain dynamics
themselves (Dumas et al., 2010; for reviews of inter-brain syn-
chronization studies, see Dumas et al., 2011 and Konvalinka and
Roepstorff, 2012). Autonomous and relational dynamics thus co-
constitute each other, such that, by interacting, we co-enact a time
whose sharing can be experienced inter-actively.
If the interaction process entails metastable relational dynam-
ics, the latter should exhibit multiscale multiplicative dynamics.
The presence of coordination of multiple behavioral cyclicities has
indeed been observed during conversational interactions (Newt-
son, 1993; Sadler et al., 2009). Moreover, relational dynamics
observed in movements had signiﬁcant interpersonal mean-
ings such as dominance and afﬁliation (Sadler et al., 2011).
Mother-infants interactions are also coordinated at multiple
timescales (Malloch, 1999; Gratier, 2008; Gratier and Apter-
Danon, 2009): they follow an implicit pulse, and form broader
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phrases as well as longer narrative cycles of vocal and behavioral
exchanges. Interestingly, the behavioral timescale of micro-
expressivity, pulses and phrases correlate well with the neurody-
namical scales described by Varela (1999a). Further, dynamics at
work at these behavioral timescales seem to interact with each
other. For instance, the lack of expressivity of deviations from
isochrony at the pulse level has long-term effects on the overall
quality of coordination (Gratier andApter-Danon,2009). Theper-
turbation of the precise simultaneity of time has deleterious effects
on the overall temporal organization of adult interactions, includ-
ing turn-takings (Ruhleder and Jordan, 2001). On top of being
multiscale, the interaction process thus exhibit signs of multiplica-
tive dynamics. Indeed, in interpersonal motor tasks, relational
variables such as relative phase or cross-correlation of periodici-
ties of behaviors exhibit fractal structures (Hennig, 2014). Further,
Ashenfelter et al. (2009) observed that head movements of conver-
sational partners have a multifractal structure. It consisted in two
fractal scalings: one at the level of local dynamics (short timescales)
and the other at a more macro level. Ashenfelter and colleagues
interpret this result as an indication of the presence of both coordi-
native processes and role alternance (or symmetry formation and
symmetry breaking). The dynamical background that underlies
interpersonal interactions is thus metastable: it is characterized by
a dynamical blend of stable integration and ﬂexible segregation of
individual behaviors (Kelso and Engstrom, 2006).
If we participate interactively to each other’s dynamical embod-
iment, then the whole complexity of our dynamically embodied
perspectives should get coordinated. In general, interacting com-
plex systems are expected to match the very complexity of each
other’s dynamical organization (West et al., 2008). Indeed, a
ﬂexibly ﬂuctuating and responsive metronome (built on non-
linearly coupled oscillators) can reinstate fractal dynamics of
Parkinson diseased patients’ gait at a normal level, whereas this
“healthy” complexity is lost as a consequence of this pathol-
ogy, as evidenced in absence of a metronome or in presence
of an unresponsive one (Hove et al., 2012). Mutually coupled
participants match each other’s fractal dynamics of behavioral
ﬂuctuations as well (Marmelat and Delignières, 2012). Partici-
pants also match the fractal dynamics of their partner when they
are unidirectionnally coupled (Marmelat et al., 2014b), but to a
far lesser extent than mutually coupled participants (Laroche,
unpublished). Co-regulated relational dynamics thus entail an
attraction of complex internal dynamics toward congruent pat-
terns of coordination. Dynamically and actively shared patterns
of coordination that are both autonomous and relational thus
emerge as wholes.
Overall, the complex temporalities that underlie our behaviors
can be strongly coordinated at multiple interacting timescales. As
a consequence, the backgrounds of our respective embodiments
are dynamically bonded in a very subtle way. It is as if we were
mutually attracted toward a common manner of “inhabiting” and
shaping the time in the course of which we live. This could be
hardly explained by individual capacities that would seek to mim-
ick such complex dynamical structures. This phenomenon rather
seems to emerge from relational dynamics between dynamical
embodiments whose respective complexities converge by attrac-
tion and co-regulation. As even chaotic signals can synchronize
their complex behavior (Strogatz, 2003), this is eventually not a
surprising phenomenon.
If complex behavioral dynamics inﬂuence each other and are
attracted toward collective patterns, their retentional and proten-
tional structures should mutually orient and shape each other,
and thereby be enactively shared. The pre-reﬂective dynami-
cal background of experience should thus be shaped by the
interaction process (Obhi and Hall, 2011). Interpersonal coor-
dination dynamics are indeed experienced meaningfully (Gratier
and Apter-Danon, 2009; Gratier and Magnier, 2012). Their co-
regulation can lead to a coordination of personal experiences
(Markey et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2010) as well as to experi-
ences of interpersonal connection (Hove and Risen, 2009; Marsh
et al., 2009; Miles et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2010; Ramseyer
and Tschacher, 2011; Watanabe et al., 2011; Vacharkulksemsuk
and Fredrickson, 2012). In turn, the embodiment of collective
dynamics favor cooperative and pro-social behaviors (Wilter-
muth and Heath, 2009; Kokal et al., 2011; Valdesolo and Desteno,
2011; Behrends et al., 2012). Unfortunately, precise ﬁrst-personal
descriptions of the lived experience of being together in time still
lacks (but see Froese et al., 2014b). However, it is precisely because
relational dynamics participate to each other’s experience that the
interaction process can be appropriated and co-regulated (Laroche
and Kaddouch, 2014; Froese et al., 2014a). Being toghether in
time is thus inter-enacted: by interacting, we embody collective
dynamics that coordinate our behaviors and experiences, and
we participate actively to the regulation of that process. By co-
regulating our embodied relational dynamics, we can co-enact a
shared world of signiﬁcance in which to be together. With this
ﬁnal remark in mind, let us now summarize and conclude this
paper.
CONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION
In this paper, we proposed a dynamical and embodied, enac-
tive framework for the understanding and the investigation of
the phenomenon of being toghether in time. We ﬁrst deﬁned
embodiment as being both a living and a lived phenomenon
that emerges from agent∼world coupling. Embodiment provides
us with a perspective on our relations, a pre-reﬂective dynam-
ical background on the basis of which we can enact the world
through autonomous embodied interactions. This background
is constituted by the self-organization of component processes
whose interactions span multiple timescales. From the point of
view of the living, temporality has a shape that is thus totally dif-
ferent from the “physical time” (Bailly and Longo, 2008; Holden,
2013). As a result of an underlying metastable regime, the tem-
porality of the living is multiscale, multiplicative, (multi-)fractal.
Behaviors and experiences thus carry the imprint of these complex
dynamics in which they are entangled. This dynamical back-
ground is at the same time co-constituted by the dynamics of
our relations with the world. Whole autonomous∼relational pat-
terns of coordination thereby emerge, so that inner (“subjective”)
and outer (“objective”) temporalities co-constitute each other
dynamically.
During between-persons interactions, relational dynamics can
self-organize and escape us. This gives rise to attractors of behavior
in the shared dynamical landscape that we enact and navigate or
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inhabit together. By exerting a mutual attraction on their under-
lying temporalities and by coordinating them in time, relational
dynamics can constitute individual behaviors and experiences. In
short, by interacting, we embody collective dynamics. Mutual-
ity of interaction further allows for the co-regulation of each
other’s background of variability, as well as the emergence of a
time that is properly intersubjective. The very complexity of our
dynamical embodiments can thereby be inter-enactively shaped
and thereby shared. This enables a strong coordination that is
not a mere local synchrony (it is not a succession of synchronous
states), but is extended in time at multiple interwoven scales.
Since intrinsic dynamics of temporal experiences and the con-
tent of these experiences co-constitute each other, by interacting
we can participate to each other’s pre-reﬂective dynamical ﬂow.
In other words, thanks to the inter-enactive process, retentions,
protentions and their multiplicative interplay can be actively and
dynamically shared (not in the sense that we have an informa-
tional duplicate of each other’s dynamical ﬂow, for such a ﬂow
always emerges from its own background, but rather in the sense
that we mutually shape each other’s pre-reﬂective dynamical back-
ground). Part of our experiences are therefore embodied in each
other’s retentions and protentions. A co-enacted dynamical land-
scape thus emerges and forms a background of collective dynamics
that brings forth a properly intersubjective time and coordinates
its personal embodiment. Behaviors and experiences are thus
entangled in this collective metastable background. By actively
co-regulating these relational dynamics and by experiencing the
effects of this co-regulation, we can experience the intersubjec-
tive dimension of this shared time as well as experience this
sharing.
Overall, being together is neither a mere co-presence in the
physical space, nor a mere temporal correlation of activities in
the physical time that can be observed from an external point of
view. It is the co-regulated and skillful inhabitance of the com-
plex, metastable dynamical landscape that emerges spontaneously
from the meeting of our embodied perspectives. Being together
has thus to be enacted, that is, it has to be actively, dynamically
and autonomously but relationally brought forth. In short, we can
only experience being together through our inter-enactive engage-
ment. In turn, this experience carries the imprint of the collective
dynamics that emerge from this inter-enactivity. However, pre-
cise phenomenological descriptions of being toghether in time
still lack. The recourse to more ﬁne-grained phenomenological
methods (e.g., Petitmengin, 2001) could guide fruitful empiri-
cal and modeling researches. Indeed, it is yet not clear how the
temporal complexity of behaviors as measured gives rise to, is
inﬂuenced by, or at least is correlated with clear and meaning-
ful felt qualities (but see Lutz et al., 2002, in the intrapersonal
domain).
Complex multiscale dynamics of interpersonal interactions
have not been much addressed yet. Notwithstanding, it is a
promising avenue of research. For instance, deﬁcits in social
coordination might be rooted in a loss of complexity, possi-
bly at both the individual and the collective level (for recent
dynamical studies, see Lazerges et al., 2011; Varlet et al., 2012,
2014; Lavelle et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2013). If we take the
interaction process seriously, as well as the complexity that
underlies our dynamical embodiment, treatments of cognitive
disorders might be improved. For example, rhythmic auditory
stimulations improve the linguistic performances of children
diagnosed with developmental language disorders (Przybylski
et al., 2013). Further, fractal metrics can distinguish between
dyslexic and normal readers in a word-naming task (Wij-
nants et al., 2012). Couldn’t a ﬂexibly ﬂuctuating and respon-
sive rhythmic device improve performances even more, in the
vein of the aforementioned work of Hove et al. (2012) with
Parkinson Disease patients? If relational dynamics coordinate
individual behaviors by modulating their underlying endoge-
nous dynamics, responsive devices might entail more healthy
dynamics, whereas part of the burden of coordinating to
this device could be unloaded onto the interaction process
itself.
Finally, coordinating in time leaves traces on embodied dynam-
ics after the interaction itself (Oullier et al., 2008; Hove et al.,
2012) on top of explicit traces of the partner himself (Macrae
et al., 2008; Miles et al., 2010). Recurrent interactions and the tem-
poral coordination they entail might enable the stabilization of
interactional repertoires as well as the emergence of long-term
and large-scale bonding such as those found in cultural practices
and habits (Gratier and Apter-Danon, 2009; Gratier and Magnier,
2012). Dynamical models of embodied interactions thus might
also play a signiﬁcant role in the understanding of socio-cultural
phenomena that are observable at larger timescales (Aguilera et al.,
2013; Cao et al., 2013).
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